Assurance profiles
Status: in development. The profile exists as a validated JSON Schema with three example profiles; wiring it into cluster provisioning is in progress. No assurance level is certified or authorized by any third party.
An assurance profile is one data object per customer cluster. Your security officer, not the buyer, fills it in. The sign-up form is generated from the same schema, and an auditor can read the same file.
What the security officer chooses
Section titled “What the security officer chooses”| Question | Choices | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Compliance baseline | NIST SP 800-53 Rev 5 Low, Moderate or High, plus overlays (FedRAMP, CJIS, CMMC, impact levels) as targets | Sets the minimums for every other field. Only Moderate and High exist as OSCAL profiles today. |
| Key custody | Our platform key service, your cloud KMS, your HSM, or Shamir shares held by your people | Decides who can ever read your data. It is the first question. |
| FIPS 140-3 | Required or not | Forces your KMS or HSM, and Keycloak in strict FIPS mode. |
| Node attestation | TPM (with approved vendors), cloud instance identity, or certificate | How SPIRE decides a machine is yours before any agent runs on it. |
| Disk encryption | TPM-sealed, KMS, or static key | High baselines reject static keys. |
| Human sign-in | Assurance level (AAL), passkeys with or without device attestation, CAC/PIV | AAL3 rejects synced passkeys; CAC/PIV needs your trust anchors. |
| Audit | Retention and immutability | High needs at least one year, immutable. |
| Evidence signing | Our key, your KMS key, and whether a public transparency log may be used | Air-gapped sites cannot use a public log. |
| Network and placement | Egress, tunnel or none, which clouds or your metal, residency | Air-gapped means your metal, no egress, no tunnel. |
| Agent policy | Which task classes are allowed (digital, physical, licensed-advisory), approval thresholds, two-person rule | Licensed tasks only ever produce drafts for a licensed human. |
What the platform refuses
Section titled “What the platform refuses”Impossible combinations are rejected before anything is built. Examples encoded today:
- A TPM requirement on a cloud with no virtual TPM.
- Air-gapped with a tunnel, any egress, our key service, a cloud KMS or a public transparency log.
- FIPS 140-3 with our key service or Shamir custody (neither is a validated module).
- High baseline with static disk keys, a low sign-in level, or short or mutable audit.
- AAL3 with synced passkeys.
Three example profiles validate today: commercial standard, FedRAMP-High-like, and air-gapped DoD-like. “Like” means shaped after those requirements, not authorized under them.
The full field reference is in the docs: assurance profiles. See the platform for where each choice lands, and the trust center for control status.